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Just as in the 1960s the pessimism about dialectical materialism was giving way 
to a new hope that Marxist dialectics can be amended or augmented by Spinoza’s 
anti-teleological philosophy, a new, seemingly intractable problem arose. 
Namely, the problem that the more one opposes regimes of power, the more this 
opposition strengthens the structural system that makes such regimes possible. 
As Foucault puts this point somewhere: “Anyone who attempts to oppose the 
law in order to found a new order … will encounter the silent and infinitely 
accommodating welcome of the law. The law does not change: it subsided 
into the grave once and for all, and each of its forms is only a metamorphosis 
of that never-ending death.” This problem is even more acute in neoliberal 
governmentality, where it becomes increasingly difficult to identify even a target 
to oppose or resist, given that executive government cedes a lot of its power to 
capital.
This may suggest that optimism of the will in the face of the pessimism of 
the intellect is even more urgent today—and yet such a stance is precarious for 
a Spinozist who would be suspicious not only of any concept of the will but also 
of the very idea of hope, given what Spinoza has to say about the will and about 
hope in his works.
The wager of the present two collections is that we may be better served 
by paying close attention to what Spinoza says about authority. Examining 
Spinoza’s authority in the full range of its significations—as prophetic authority 
or as sovereignty, as power or as authoritative process of interpretation—we may 
be able to evade the dilemma between pessimism and optimism. In fact, we may 
be able to steer a path that shows how resistance is possible because authority is 
ever present as obedience or as the sad emotions that decrease our power.
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Any discussion of authority in Spinoza’s political treatises—both the 
Theological-Political Treatise and the Political Treatise—needs to start by 
explaining what “authority” means in this context. There are at least three words 
in Latin which cover the semantic range of the term authority in English. They 
are “auctoritas,” “imperium” and “summa potestas.”
“Auctoritas” traditionally refers to a personal authority. Since the Roman 
Republic, one is understood to have “auctoritas” when his or her authority is not 
only unquestioned but moreover unquestionable. One can imagine here elderly 
wise figureheads, or figures whose office puts them in a higher and untouchable 
position. Spinoza’s primary example of figures of auctoritas are the prophets, 
whose revealed knowledge cannot be questioned. One good way to understand 
auctoritas is to consider what it is that resists it. Traditionally, the answer to this 
question is laughter. Thus, the function of the court jester had been to laugh 
at the authority of the king—and by virtue of being the only figure who could 
perform that function to reinforce that authority. Maybe Spinoza’s transgression, 
which earned him the unwanted honor of the greatest atheist in the modern 
philosophical tradition, was to laugh at the auctoritas of the prophets in the 
Theological-Political Treatise by showing the absurdity, for instance, of holding 
their laws as inviolable. The humor of the Theological-Political Treatise is linked 
to the strategy to undermine the authority of the prophets.
By contrast, one cannot laugh at “imperium.” The word in Latin points 
to the limits of the authority’s exercise of power. Thus, the imperium of a 
sovereign would be the territory within which the sovereign can exercise power. 
Synecdochically, imperium contains a legal aspect as it points out how far a 
legal system extends, or who is covered by certain laws. There is something less 
personal and more abstract in the term imperium in comparison to auctoritas. 
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Thus, although the word imperium has something of authority, it may be best 
translated in most cases as state. Imperium can be challenged by questioning 
how far it extends. This strategy to challenge imperium came to the fore with 
the Reformation by questioning the Roman Catholic Pope’s imperium in 
imperio (or, state within a state), the idea being that Ecclesiastical and sovereign 
authorities should not overlap. Or, more simply—but no less problematically—
the state becomes separate from the Church. Spinoza’s political treatises and 
his conception and use of the various senses of authority are informed by the 
debates about the limits of imperium which were raging for over a century when 
he started writing his treatises.
If auctoritas points to a personal authority and imperium to the limits of 
impersonal authority, “summa potestas” points to the authority that has the 
greatest power within a realm. By implication, that power is the sovereign. 
Even if the expression “summa potestas” is an established term in Latin legal 
and political discourse, still it is worth pointing out that “potestas” on its own 
points to the power of the people. Even if summa potestas cannot be normally 
mistaken with the power of the people, still it retains its main characteristic, 
namely, the possibility that it can express itself in violent ways. Or, differently 
put, the exercise of violence is inherent in summa potestas. Spinoza points to 
an implication of this idea by noting that the most powerful violence does not 
actually originate from the sovereign, but rather from the people themselves. 
Thus, it is the multitude that is most feared, and in that sense, even in a monarchy, 
as he argues in the Political Treatise, the people ultimately hold more power than 
the sovereign. Hence, ultimately, it is the people who hold power—which is 
why Spinoza can be understood as arguing that democracy is the most primary 
constitution.
We have, then, three terms that denote authority: auctoritas points to 
personal authority, imperium to the limits of juridico-political authority, and 
summa potestas to the most powerful authority. Both the difficulty and the 
novelty in Spinoza’s position consist in that the three different senses of authority 
are distinct and yet they overlap. Let me provide one example. The “secular” 
position according to which the Church should not have imperium in imperio is 
absent from Spinoza’s work. Those with auctoritas are shown to be lawgivers and 
to yield political power and this entails that religion and politics cannot neatly 
demarcate their territories. In addition, Spinoza uses the same vocabulary (for 
instance, Ethics Part III) to indicate the illusion of the free will, or the illusion 
that humans can free themselves from natural causes. Within this context, the 
question of authority is transformed into a question about the power or potentia 
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as the capacity of people to act rationally given their emotional circumstances. 
In other words, the three sense of authority outlined above intersect and interact 
in a revamped and ontologized notion of power (potentia) that Spinoza inherits 
from Machiavelli and which he develops even further.
The first chapter of this book by Vittorio Morfino explores some of the 
roots of Spinoza’s conception of power in Machiavelli. Despite the fact that 
Machiavelli is not explicitly named in the Theological-Political Treatise, Morfino 
argues that his presence is felt throughout. Morfino starts tracing this influence 
in the way history is developed within the context of the argument about the 
Jews as an elected people, showing the presence of Machiavelli’s use of the 
concept of fortune. Then, Morfino goes on to show that this conception of 
history is materialist since memory has been preserved and transmitted based 
on the operation of the aleatory. Finally, Machiavelli’s insistence on the centrality 
of conflict for the flourishing of the state in the opening of the Discourses is 
instrumental in Spinoza’s deconstruction of the authority of the lawgivers. These 
are not three arbitrary sites of comparison with the Florentine but rather points 
with far-reaching implications, for instance about the way in which the social 
contract and society itself are conceived.
The next chapter by Filippo Del Lucchese also takes as its point of departure 
Machiavelli’s influence on Spinoza to argue that conflict is the productive element 
that leads to freedom. Drawing on Vittorio Morfino’s link between freedom 
and Spinoza’s conception of causality as connection, Del Lucchese proposes to 
investigate a question that has puzzled many commentators, especially those 
who seek in Spinoza an alternative revolutionary politics that does not rely on 
the dialectical materialism of the Marxist tradition. Given that both the idea 
of a radical break in the course of history and the idea of a cyclical movement 
between degenerate and good constitutions are ultimately incompatible with the 
Spinozan account of politics and history, how can we give an account of the 
revolutionary in Spinoza? Del Lucchese responds by pointing to the confluence 
of jus (law and right) and power and by drawing the implications that this entails 
for a conception of the state. Ultimately, this leads to the conclusion that the 
revolution is permanently unfolding in Spinoza’s politics, as the relation between 
law and conflict and in such a way so as to mirror his rejection of the dualism 
between mind and body.
The idea of the law is further elaborated in Dimitris Vardoulakis’ chapter. 
Starting with the distinction between divine and human law in Chapter 4 of 
the Theological-Political Treatise, Vardoulakis points out another Machiavellian 
idea that has found its way into Spinoza’s work, namely, that the law is defined 
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in terms of its utility. The figure of auctoritas is important in this context, as 
it allows Spinoza to draw inferences about history and politics. Of particular 
importance is the idea that the utility of the law is articulated as obedience. Given 
that the divine law cannot be disobeyed, as Spinoza’s retelling of the narrative of 
the Fall avers, what does this mean about the genesis of human law? Vardoulakis 
shows that the radical conclusion entailed in Spinoza’s analysis of Adam’s action 
is that human law is premised on its disobedience. Furthermore, Adam as the 
first prophet, and hence as a paradigmatic figure of authority, also discloses that 
authority is generated and perpetuated by a miscognition, namely, the confusion 
between divine and human law.
The discussion of the law in Chapter 4 of the Theological-Political Treatise 
indicates the vital role that interpretation plays in Spinoza’s adumbration 
of authority. By looking at interpretation, James Martel makes a surprising 
comparison between Spinoza and Hobbes. His argument is that they are both 
keen to challenge the established norms of authority. Comparing their methods 
of Biblical interpretation Martel arrives at the conclusion that Hobbes is more 
radical and democratic in the sense that he leaves the possibility of alternative—
or unauthoritative—interpretations more open than Spinoza, and hence invites 
the demos to participate in the interpretative process. Furthermore, Martel 
shows that both seventeenth-century thinkers seek to undermine sovereign 
authority by examining the Hebrew state. In this case, it is Spinoza who appears 
more radical than Hobbes. But ultimately this comparison is not a matter of 
measuring the radicality of Spinoza and Hobbes against each other, but rather in 
demonstrating that resistance to authority can be inscribed in a variety of ways 
within their texts—and comparisons between the two may better help us see the 
nuances of their politics of resistance.
The process of interpretation is also linked, as Siarhei Biareishyk demonstrates, 
also to the way that Spinoza conceives of error. Biareishyk shows that error has 
both an epistemological and an ontological dimension in Spinoza, whereby 
it further rises to a political significance. Starting with outlining the relation 
between error and the three types of knowledge, Biareishyk shows that even 
though they are all similar in that they misunderstand the nature of cause and 
effect in different ways, it is nevertheless only the third kind of error, linked to 
the third kind of knowledge, that can also lead to truth as it has the capacity 
to demarcate a field of interpretation. Thus, this third kind of error retains the 
potential of a political realization. Or, to put it differently, the third kind of error 
leads to truth through its effects. This insight links Biareishyk’s analysis of error 
to Althusser’s symptomatic readings and his theory of the encounter.
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How can the interpretative process in Spinoza’s political treatises be 
accommodated within his monism? And what are the political implications of 
this question? These are the questions animating Kiarina Kordela and Joseph 
Bermas-Dawes’ contribution. They are trenchant question because—to use 
Deleuze’s vocabulary—if expression is separated from the sign, does not this 
lead us back to dualism? To counter this result, the authors insist that there 
is in Spinoza an immanent relation between expression and sign, one that 
replicates the relation between truth and error, as the two standards of truth 
in Spinoza’s theory. This has implications in how resistance against authority 
can be conceived. The authors argue that authority lies in interpretation, 
insofar as interpretation involves decision. But at the same time, the fact that 
power is natural and that it cannot be confined to the potentate’s authority also 
means that the multitude always also possesses power and hence the authority 
to interpret. This entails that political interpretation is not confined to the 
sovereign’s decision, as it is in Carl Schmitt and generally decisionism. Instead, 
Spinoza’s political interpretative decision is imbued with the fantasies and 
ideological processes that make it possible to recuperate truth from the errors 
of the multitude. Drawing on psychoanalysis the authors show that in Spinoza’s 
work such (secondary) fantasies and ideological processes are modes of some 
unconscious primal fantasy (truth). The authors then trace the relation between 
the secondary and primary fantasies in Spinoza’s own interpretation of the Bible, 
as the blueprint for similar analyses on the level of politics.
Gregg Lambert is also concerned with the relation between expression 
and sign. Lambert argues that there are two regions of expression, one that 
pertains to truth and it corresponds to philosophy, and another that pertains to 
interpretation that is explicated through prophetic and sovereign authority in 
the Theological-Political Treatise. Drawing attention to Spinoza’s point that the 
sole concern of interpretation in Spinoza’s Treatise pertains to the production of 
authority, Lambert outlines a typology of signs, which ultimately demonstrates 
that expression and expressed do not coincide. This entails that procedures 
of truth and interpretation are discordant. Given that interpretation is the 
source of authority, this insight leads to the conclusion that the production 
of power through the authority of the prophets as well as the sovereigns rests 
on misapprehension. Lambert explains how this is presented in Spinoza’s 
interpretation of the two covenants that Spinoza outlines in Chapter 17 of the 
Theological-Political Treatise, and he links this to a concept of resistance.
At the beginning of the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza famously 
puzzles as to why people fight for their servitude instead of their liberation. 
Spinoza’s Authority Volume II6
Chiara Bottici and Miguel de Beistegui explore what is at stake in Spinoza 
asking this question. They demonstrate that it has to do with how authority 
instils obedience. If, as Spinoza avers, obedience is most effective when it is not 
coercive but rather when the people willingly obey, what is it that makes us obey? 
Bottici and Beistegui show how Spinoza explains this through his theory of the 
emotions. Spinoza describes a technology of government that relies on creating 
desires of artificial lack that function as a void and hence resemble the operation 
of the siphon. Obedience is channeled through such emotions. As the authors 
note, the operation of the siphon of the emotion is also operative in a neoliberal 
governmentality where desires are siphoned off through the market. Comparing 
Spinoza’s political analysis in the Treatise to the theory of the affects in Part III of 
the Ethics, the authors point out that Spinoza provides us with the tool to reverse 
the effect of desire, so that we can produce a plenitude of being.
